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This paper was written with two principal aims. The first is to offer a biographical
sketch of the life of György Kalmár. The second is to present his universal language
plan as a theory of language.
Keywords: György Kalmár, linguistics, universal language plan, cognition, trans-
lation, signification, hermeneutics
György Kalmár is perhaps not the best-known figure in the European history of
ideas. Nevertheless, his universal language plan gained him a continental recogni-
tion in the 18th century and it still makes him a household name for the research-
ers of this particular subject. Recently Umberto Eco praised Kalmár’s plan in his
The Search for the Perfect Language:
In 1772 there appeared the project of Georg Kalmar, Praecepta
grammatica atque specimina lingua philosophicae sive universalis
[…], which occasioned the most significant discussion on our topic
written in Italian.2
Eco then goes on to describe this discussion and not Kalmár’s particular work.
In fact this discussion actually was induced not by the book Eco mentions, but by
its 1773 Italian edition. On the other hand, it is also highly revealing to see how
Kalmár’s name gets modified as he is referred to by contemporary scholars. In
Hungarian his name goes as Kalmár György, that is, the second a in the surname is
accentuated. He used this version of his surname in every non-Hungarian edition
of his books, and always translated only his first name to other languages. Conse-
quently the author of the book Eco referred to was not Georg Kalmar, but
Georgius Kalmár. Sadly enough, the low level of his recognition even in Hungar-
ian culture is indicated by the fact that the Hungarian translators of Eco’s book
failed to realize that this obscure person was he Hungarian Kalmár György, and
they kept the name “Georg Kalmar”, which does not make any sense.
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As an addition to this obscurity, the life of the author named György Kalmár is
also full of uncertainties and strange features.3 In what follows, I will outline what
we know of his life to bring this 18th century Central-East-European figure a bit
closer to the reader.
At first sight a contrast appears between Kalmár as an author and as a real-life
person. In Hungarian scholarship Kalmár has been traditionally considered an ec-
centric or even a lunatic, and definitely an alcoholic, who produced a great deal of
unreadable hexameters. His most important work, the plan for an universal lan-
guage was simply beyond the 18th century Hungarian intellectuals, who were,
quite frankly, rather ‘under-qualified’ in terms of philosophy. Even Ferenc
Kazinczy, an emblematic figure of 18th century Hungarian literature, admitted
that he did not understand Kalmár’s works at all, but he emphasized that Kalmár
was known to have consumed only vinegar and grains during his Oriental travels.
In 1772 the famous Strabon-translator, Abraham Jacob Penzel of Breslau
wrote a letter to the renowned philosopher-mathematician Johann Heinrich Lam-
bert of Berlin. In the letter he described his last night visitor: a dishevelled,
squalid, sick-looking man who claimed himself to be György Kalmár. Penzel
knew the works of Kalmár, the famous grammarian and scholar, so he could not
believe that this tramp was the author of those books, he could not be identical
with Kalmár. As the tramp mentioned Lambert as his alleged patron, Penzel was
eager to warn Lambert. But in his reply Lambert confirmed the unbelievable, that
man must have been nobody else but Kalmár (whose book he had published the
previous year in Berlin), for the description, his looks and behaviour, that is, at
night he usually ended up getting drunk, fits him perfectly.4
Now, let me give a more detailed introduction of this strange and extraordinary
figure. He was born in 1726 in Tapolcafõ, Hungary. After his studies in Debrecen
he went to Oxford in 1749, and there in the following year he published his disser-
tation written in Latin. In 1751 he contributed three pamphlets in English to the
debate between the Hutchinsonians and Thomas Sharp. As a matter of fact, he was
the only scholar who joined the debate defending Sharp. No doubt that this con-
troversy definitely had an impact on the formation of Kalmár’s language theory.
We do not know too much about Kalmár’s residence in Britain or about his per-
sonal and intellectual contacts. According to his own account, he won an award
with his Oxford dissertation and it covered the costs of his first great journey. Un-
fortunately, from this time of his life only a few letters survived, but those clearly
show that he was in correspondence with scholars not only from Britain, but also
from New England, like Ezra Stiles of New Haven.
In 1753 Kalmár travelled to the Netherlands, Switzerland, and in 1754 to Italy.
Then he left Rome for Hungary via Vienna. Shortly after, he set off again and trav-
elled to Constantinople via Transylvania and Bucharest. He spent seven months in
the Ottoman Empire. We do not know too much about the reasons of his Mid-
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dle-East travels, in a letter he himself mentions the purpose of learning more lan-
guages.
Later he visited Egypt, where he spent one month. His next destination was
Palestine, then he returned to Constantinople. During his 17-month Oriental trip
he enjoyed the hospitality of British ambassadors and consuls. In general, the
strange-looking, eccentric Kalmár had exceptionally and surprisingly good con-
tacts. The subscribers of his books included aristocrats, ambassadors, ministers,
even Catholic bishops.
From Constantinople now he left for Russia via Moldavia. He spent half a year
there and in 1757 he came home via Poland. The fact that he was offered the chair
of the Hebrew department at the university of Saint Petersburg indicates the repu-
tation he must have gained by that time. Nevertheless, he declined the offer,
claiming that he wished to return to Hungary and pursue his activities there.
In the meantime, the books he had obtained in England got stuck in Belgium.
Being eager to get them back, in 1759 he travelled to Switzerland, where he had
his Hebrew grammar published in Latin. Then he moved on to Copenhagen via
Strasbourg. The details of the subsequent legs of his second European trip are dif-
ficult to follow: what we know is that he definitely visited Königsberg,5 Halle,
Leipzig, Breslau, Warsaw, and he also appeared in Iapi, Moldavia and Transyl-
vania.
The books he had bought in Britain were finally delivered to Hungary in 1762,
but the censorial office confiscated them at the border. As a lucky consequence, at
least we have a list of his books. We also do know of his next trip in 1767, when he
appeared in Jena, and in the same year in Halle he had his Hebrew grammar pub-
lished in Ancient Greek. This work is one of the two of the kind ever made. He
carried 200 copies to Saint Petersburg, where Gabriel metropolite offered him
again the chair of the Hebrew department. Kalmár rejected the offer again.
By this time he certainly had contacts with some of the most significant schol-
ars of the age (e.g., Lomonosow, Johan Georg Hamann, Breitinger, Beck,
Hagenbuch, van Swieten, etc.). However, what gained him a really widespread
recognition was his universal language plan. First it was published in Berlin and
Leipzig in 1772, it was sponsored by Johann Heinrich Lambert, and one of the few
subscribers was Moses Mendelssohn. The work also appeared in Italian transla-
tion in Rome and a year later in German in Vienna.
In these years, a disciplinary procedure was initiated against him by the Calvin-
istic Church. In the course of the procedure Kalmár’s pietist conversion was re-
corded in several documents. From the 1770s onwards fewer references can be
found, most of them mocking his personality. By 1781 he had disappeared com-
pletely, both the date and the place of his death are yet to be found out.
The most detailed presentation of Kalmár’s language theory can be found in his
universal language plan. However, we can distinguish no less than three versions.
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The first one, as I have mentioned, was published in Latin in Berlin in 1772. To
the Italian version, published in 1773, he added an introduction about linguistic
theory. The most elaborate, and third, version was published in German in Vienna
in 1774.6
Reading Kalmár’s oeuvre, one can quickly identify some constant features and
recurrent claims, such as, first, the insistence on the necessity of interpreting the
perceived world, second, using figurative language as a unique tool of interpreta-
tion. It is quite striking that even though Kalmár was quite familiar with both the
preceding and the contemporary universal language theories (including Bishop
John Wilkins’ famous work), he disagreed with their theoretical basis. His aim
was not creating a unique general language, but showing the common features in
various, possibly all, languages, and signify them with specific characters and
symbols. What made his plan unique was that he did not attach one specific mean-
ing to his signs, because, according to his insistence on the extreme heterogeneity
of language, meaning for him only existed in context.7
Consequently, he did not consider figurality an error occasionally made by us-
ing language, but a necessary basis for all speech acts. As for cognition, he took
for granted both the figurative nature and the indispensability of language. Theo-
ries of language, if based on an Aristotelian epistemology, took metaphor as a way
of transferring a word from one meaning to another on the basis of similarity. This
inevitably results in inaccurate language usage, even if it should be avoided in the-
oretical language reflecting the world. However, Kalmár shared Lambert’s view
that the figural usage is one of the most important means of language extension in
semiotics: metaphorical meanings may become independent, and only context
will clearly decide the actual meaning. The historical change the meaning of a
word goes through also confirms this. (I must note that although independent met-
aphorical meaning is still based on the comparison of characteristics, this fact is
not relevant for now.) Furthermore, Lambert – quite surprisingly – considers the
metaphorical meaning of a word a natural sign precisely because – unlike the con-
cept of linguistic signs in Leibniz’s Wechselzettel theory – he sees well-applied
metaphors related to the replaced notion, if not the represented entity itself.
In general, Kalmár’s language theory had its origins in 17th–18th century epis-
temology and the ideology of continental pietism. In what follows, I will use
Leibniz’s theory of cognitio symbolica as a guiding principle to integrate
Kalmár’s theory into the corresponding philosophical tradition and to outline a
parallel theological tradition. Leaving his early works out of consideration and
analysing only his universal language plan would prove insufficient for getting a
comprehensive picture of his language theory in general.8
The work in Kalmár’s oeuvre that attracted the most attention in Hungarian lit-
erary history was his Prodromus idiomatis Scythico-Mogorico-Chuno-Avarici:
sive adparatus criticus ad linguam Hungaricam, published in Pressburg/Bra-
64 BÉLA HEGEDÜS
tislava in 1770. It consists of two parts: the first is a Hungarian grammar in Latin,
with the first Hungarian prosody on metrical Hungarian versification attached.
The second part is a poem in Hungarian consisting of 5000 hexameters under the
title: Valóságos magyar ABC (An English translation could be: True alphabets of
the world in Hungarian language). The Latin title given by Kalmár varies a bit:
Thesaurus Hungaricus. His own definition of its genre: poema universale.
In the poem he elaborates the following problem: even if language may be able
to express each and every idea and thought, this language could not be used (in an
adequate way) until we possess a real and genuine knowledge of the world. Due to
mankind’s original sin, cognitio clara as defined by Leibniz is not feasible. Nev-
ertheless, Kalmár claims that language is still the only source of cognition, be-
cause all existing languages bear traces of the wisdom from the period preceding
the original sin. The most essential evidence for this is the Bible.
The same ideas also appear in the introduction on linguistic theory Kalmár at-
tached to the German translation of his universal language plan.
1.) Erhellet aus dem schon gesagten, dass keine Sprache sey, die
nicht etwas philosophie in sich enthielte; und in diesem weitesten
verstande ist jede Sprache philosophisch.9
Using basic epistemological terms Kalmár interprets words as Wechselzettel –
similarly to Leibniz Unvorgreifflichen Gedanken:
So wie die bilder der Dinge, durch die Kunst der Maler aufgestellt,
die dinge selbst ausdrücken; eben so sind begriffe der dinge
schilderungen der dinge selbsten, wenn sie mit gewissen wörtern, als
zeichen ausgedrückt werden.10
Consequently, Kalmár also had to deal with the concept of linguistic heteroge-
neity. He had to provide an explanation to the generally experienced phenomenon
that two speakers can actually understand each other. This is how he puts it:
…jeder Besitzer [“owner of language”, which he also uses as “lan-
guage user”] seine eigene nur ihm vertraute, und folglich von den
übrigen verschiedene Sprache schreibet und redet. In dieser
metphysischen betrachtung redet man anders mit GOTT, anders mit
dem regierenden Fürsten, anders mit dessen Erben […]. Anders
spricht der Bräutigam mit der Braut, anders der Mann mit dem
Eheweibe, und wieder anders, wenn sie beyde tugendhaft, oder ein
theil, oder beyde verderbt sind. Gebe man zu, dass die in allen diesen
besonderen fällen gebrauchten Worte und Redensarten einer Sprache
physisch die nämlichen sind. Wer dieses auch von ihrer meta-
physischen beschaffenheit und ihrem nachdruck behaupten wollte,
würde sehr weit von der wahrheit abgehn.11
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Kalmár claims that despite the homogeneity in language, each speaker has his
own usage of the language, if a sign for an idea, a word is explained in a thorough
way, possibly with more than one word, then the language users will be able to un-
derstand each other.
Consequently, real understanding depends exclusively on the specific linguis-
tic situation. This accounts for the most significant attribute of his universal lan-
guage plan: in contrast with taxonomic systems, he uses a set of no more than 400
characters, because he believes that the proper use of these characters in various
situations would allow expressing any possible idea. This is the reason why he
does not refer to his language plan as an “invented language”, for he thinks that its
core to which he gives birth can be found in all languages, and as such, it is di-
rectly available to everyone capable of speaking any language. Therefore, he
firmly distinguishes between his own plan and the preceding ones:
...was ich schon gesagt habe, dass jene Philosophische oder Allge-
meine Sprache, metaphysisch betrachtet, immer vorhanden gewesen
sey, ehe noch ein erhabner Lambert und die scharfsichtigen Weisen
des Cartes und Wolf auf ihre Art davon dachten; ehe der verbreitete
und dennoch so gründliche Genius eines Leibnitzes darüber zu rathe
gieng, und seine Vorschläge in einem Beyspiele, nach seiner Art
daran machte; ehe sie noch Kircher, Dahlgarne, Becher, und andre,
jeder auf seine Art, und Solbrig mit den 12000 Zusammensetzungen
der Zahlziffern versuchte…12
What also follows is that the language he rediscovered may only exist in and as
writing, however, its written nature does not correspond to that of other lan-
guages, as it is more of a thought-language, that is, an immediate representation of
conceptual contents and ideas. And this is where the early Hutchinsonian debate
on the “scripture-Meaning of the words in Elohim and Berith” joins in. (The de-
bate in which Kalmár, as I have mentioned, was also involved during his Oxford
and London years, two decades before the publication of his universal language
plans.)13 I will not outline the Hutchinsonian movement now, but touch only some
points of the discussion relevant to Kalmár’s theory of language.14
Consider the following points made by the Hutchinsonians: according to them,
Hebrew is not only the primary language of divine revelation, but also the lan-
guage which brought about a fellowship between the Trinity even before the Gen-
esis. Therefore, “real Hebrew” can exclusively be found in the unpunctuated text
of the Old Testament; the punctuated version written by “apostate Jews” is not
faithful to the original text. Consequently, the Hebrew Scriptures as restored by
the Hutchinsonians provide the ultimate source of all human knowledge. This
supposition is refuted in an effective way by the anti-Hutchinsonian Arthur Bed-
ford, already in the first phase of the debate:
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I will note say (as the Author doth) that they [wiz: Hebrew Scrip-
tures] are Repositories of all natural Knowledge, there are many
Propositions in Euclid, which I cannot demonstrate from thence, and
many Particulars in experimental Philosophy both Terrestrial and
Celestial, which they were never intended to give us any Account
of.15
According to the Hutchinsonians, no language can amount to the perfection of
signification in Hebrew, therefore almost all their writings are characterized by
their hostility towards translation.16
The idea of the impossibility of translation also occurred in the second phase of
the Hutchinsonian debates. Julius Bate claimed – as a logical outcome of John
Locke’s theory of language – that even in the translation of the Old Testament
what we comprehend are not the words of God, but those of the translator.17 David
Aboab also raises this issue: May I declare that the word God is not merely a
translation of Deus, or the latter that of theosz…? In Aboab’s view this can only
be approved if it can be verified that the English word is of the same meaning as
the Latin, and the Latin as the Greek. In the defense of translation it can be claimed
that in English the word God is the general signifier of the Supreme Being, just
like the Latin Deus, the Greek theosz, the Hebrew Elohim, however, they all differ
in their meanings.
Kalmár simply defies this theory of intranslatability. The basis of his refusal is
a peculiar interpretation of the arbitrariness of the linguistic sign, a fact he himself
nevertheless acknowledged, which he elaborated in his polemical essay against
Aboab. First he strictly reduces the arbitrariness of the linguistic sign to arbitrary
denomination:
By arbitrary denomination I mean, that it depends wholly on one’s
Will or Choice to give to such a thing, or to such an action, such a
Name, which either conveys with itself any Idea of any property, or
any circumstance, to be found in, or, about that very thing or action;
or none at all.
Kalmár gives the example that if one happens to see a gold mountain yet un-
known, and gives it the name of Ab. But it would be equally arbitrary if he desig-
nated it on the basis of the ideas of its composing parts.18 Therefore, quite signifi-
cantly, arbitrariness does not imply the impossibility of any relation between
signifier and signified. At first it might seem that in the case of ultimate arbitrari-
ness, unrelated to ideas and circumstances, relations emerge only between things
and words, and not between ideas and words. As a matter of fact, Kalmár’s thesis
does not include this argument, however, it can be deduced from it. Nevertheless
his pamphlet against Bate excludes this possibility. In the immediate context of
his statement he uses the word concretum to designate the thing/object, and
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abstractum to designate idea: “the concretum cannot be conceived without imply-
ing, or be declared but by, its abstractum.”19 My interpretations are as follows: 1)
the thing/object cannot be perceived without involving its idea; 2) statements
about a thing/object can only be made through its idea. This claim is worth further
elaboration, however at the present I focus on the interpretation according to
which the level of ideas is at work even during completely arbitrary designations,
although according to Kalmár it fulfills only one condition. He does not write
about the arbitrariness of the idea, but the concept of expression he introduced in
his pamphlet against Bate, dealing with the translatability of the Bible and the ut-
terances of Jesus, might be connected to this problem. According to this locus, an
expression remains the same even if uttered in different languages. Perhaps the
meaning of the Hungarian expression kimondó, which Kalmár introduced in the
1770s in his Magyar Merkúrius, is also to be found here.20
Nevertheless, if we take this idea further, what we see is a unique epis-
temological-linguistic experiment that must not be smiled at. Let us take a lan-
guage, Hebrew this time, and all the past, present and future writings and revela-
tions in that language as one set. Now let us define within this set a sub-set with
clear limits. What makes this a bit easier is that this sub-set – Old Testament, or
the Hebrew Scriptures as Hutchinsonians called it – is written and completed.
Now try to conceive the inconceivable: this sub-set has nothing to do with the set.
Words of the sub-set can be (explained and) interpreted only within the sub-set.
This is how to grab a meta-language, which – thanks to its divine origin – is com-
pletely suitable for interpreting the world. If we add that in this language – accord-
ing to the Hutchinsonians – each root has only one specific meaning which is kept
even in the derivations, then we have the 17th–18th century linguists’ great dream
come true: the perfect universal language.
In the documents of the debate one can see that, quite naturally, most of the
anti-Hutchinsonian arguments were taken from Hebrew philology. This was the
very reason why the opposing parties failed to have a real debate. Kalmár seems to
be the only participant who tried to analyse the meaning of words irrespectively of
Hebrew philology. Even he was ready to admit that words never have a meaning,
only the so-called expressions. As he puts it in his work “Mr. Bate’s Answer to Dr.
Sharp’s two Dissertations answered: being Vindication of the Etymology and
Scripture-Meaning of Elohim and Berith”:
It doth not signify, what Language Christ talked in, whether Hebrew,
or Syriac or Greek etc.: it is enough for our purpose that he hath used
the same Expression. Cannot one use the same expression in English.
or Irish. or Welsh. or French. or Dutch etc?21
This argument clearly is an antecedent of Kalmár’s later universal language
theory of 400 signs (roots) in figural usage being sufficient for an educated person
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to read texts written in the universal language in the same expression. The origins
of the linguistic framework of Kalmár’s plan for a universal language are to be
found somewhere here, in the Hutchinsonian debate, a debate basically about two
particular Hebrew words.
This correspondence could be further stressed by the fact the first publication, a
proposal, in which Kalmár had brought forward his universal language, followed
directly his pamphlets and appeared while he was still in London in 1753 under
the title: PROPOSALS For printing by SUBSCRIPTION, AN UNIVERSAL
LANGUAGE. In that text he gives the following explanation:
THIS LANGUAGE is adapted not only to those of all Nations (even
to that of the Chinese, in some part, that can read and write at all); but
also to all Arts and Sciences. It is, upon the whole, promising so
much that no sooner one looks over it, but he finds in himself an In-
clination and Readiness to, and, of course, a great Pleasure in, the
learning to fit. … And as for the LANGUAGE itself, there is very lit-
tle in it that was drawn after Bishop Wilkin’s Plan.22
As this argument proves, Kalmár’s views are radically different from John
Wilkins’ tautological system. And not only in the comprehensive theory he pub-
lished somewhat two decades later, but already in his early contribution to the
Hutchinsonian debate as well.
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